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The paper deals with changes in the regulation and supervision 
of the Latin American financial sector in the aftermath of the “Tequila 
Crisis” of 1994-1995. While it finds that both have improved, 
regulation and supervision cannot resolve all problems; good 
macroeconomic policy and performance are essential complements. 
This is especially true because of the procyclical nature of financial 
activity. The paper presents both regional data for Latin America, 
contrasting it with other emerging markets, and four country case 
studies (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico). The latter show how 
individual country characteristics and experiences affect the operation 
of the financial systems. We close with some policy recommendations. 
JEL classification: N26, N46, O54 





The increasing integration of international financial markets 
poses new challenges to domestic financial markets everywhere, but 
especially to those in emerging economies. The financial crises of 
1994-1995 and 1997-1998 sounded wake-up calls to Latin America 
and East Asia, respectively, indicating that regulation and supervision 
needed to be strengthened substantially. Since then, important steps 
have been taken to improve the rules and ensure their implementation, 
but financial regulation and supervision do not take place in a vacuum. 
On the one hand, they must be consistent with domestic 
macroeconomic policies, and they need a supportive macroeconomic 
environment in which to operate —as the Argentine crisis that began 
in 2001 shows only too well. On the other hand, they have to take into 
account the international rules set by the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and other 
institutions. 
The issue that links this chapter with the others in the WIDER 
project is that volatility —deriving from international capital flows as 
well as macroeconomic trends in individual countries— is a leading 
cause of financial crises. Problems of individual banks can set off 
chain reactions, both because of the direct links between banks and 
because of the effects that bank collapses may have on borrowers’ 
capacity to honor commitments. This is the main rationale for the 
concept of systemic risk. Financial regulation is meant to mitigate 
systemic risk by imposing restrictions both on the way banks finance 
their operations and on how they allocate their portfolios. The aim is to 
insure that they engage in adequate assessment of the risks implied in 
their activities, make provisions for expected losses, and maintain 
enough capital to absorb unexpected losses. 
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There is a good deal of evidence that financial activity is highly procyclical. This problem 
goes beyond the usual asymmetric information problem and has to do with at least two processes. 
First, increasing confidence among individual investors tends to generate a self-fulfilling process of 
change in asset prices. As investors become more optimistic, they try to expand their holdings of 
such assets at a pace that is far more rapid than that of their supply. Booms in asset prices then tend 
to corroborate past expectations, leading to further optimism. Individual risk assessment thus 
changes with the state of collective enthusiasm. Second, banks are also procyclical, even though the 
chain of reaction is slightly different. Waves of optimism in the banking sector lead to an expansion 
of lending, which affects the level of aggregate demand and thus the income and cash flow of 
consumers and the productive sector. In times of expansion, real and financial asset prices increase, 
and so does the value of collateral. Through these self-fulfilling processes, banks tend to increase 
their leverage and thus their vulnerability to changes in the variables that affect their risks: 
economic activity and level of employment (credit risk), borrowing interest rates (liquidity risk), 
and asset prices (market risk). 
This chapter examines financial sector behaviour from the viewpoint of Latin America, 
although many of the same problems and attempts at solutions can also be found in other emerging 
economies.1 Section II begins with a brief look at the structure of the financial sector as a whole, 
which has changed substantially over the last decade. Despite these changes, banks continue to 
dominate the sector and so we focus on them in our analysis. In this context, we turn to the 
regulatory and supervisory systems for the banks and to developments since the Mexican crisis in 
1994-1995. We also look briefly at the new international guidelines being proposed by the BIS and 
the IMF to ask whether they will help shelter the banking systems from the types of shocks they 
have suffered in the recent past or create additional problems. 
In section III, we move to case studies of four of the most important countries in the region: 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. Through examination of the experiences of the four, we can 
get a better idea of how the changes came about and the way in which individual country 
characteristics affect the operation of the financial systems. These two sections provide evidence 
that bank regulation and supervision in Latin America have improved in recent years, but much 
remains to be done. Section IV presents our policy recommendations for the future. 
Certainly we are not the first to discuss these topics. On the contrary, over the last few years, 
there has been a virtual explosion of research on the financial sector in developing countries, 
including issues of regulation and supervision.2 We draw on this literature where relevant, in both 
its theoretical and empirical dimensions, and bring it to bear on the issues under consideration in the 







                                                 
1 See, for example, discussion of these topics in Asia in Masuyama et al. (1999) and ESCAP (1999, 2000). 
2 The most extensive work has been done by the Development Research Group and the Financial Sector Strategy and Policy 
Department of the World Bank. It has been summarized in World Bank (2001); background papers can be found on the Bank 
website. The annual reports and working papers of the BIS are very useful, especially with respect to the issue of cycles (e.g., Borio 
et al. 2001), as are the publications of the Financial Stability Forum. The IMF annual publication, International Capital Markets, 
contains extensive data and analysis, and the financial sector assessment papers can now be found on the IMF website. On regulation 
and supervision in Latin America, see Held and Szalachman (1991), Norton and Aguirre (1998), United Nations (1999), and Aguirre 
(2000). 
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II. The financial sector in Latin 
America in the 1990s 
A. Liberalization, crisis, and rescue: some 
stylized facts 
The essential background for understanding current 
developments in the financial sector in Latin America is the financial 
liberalization process, both domestic and international, which took 
place in the 1980s and 1990s in most countries. Chile was an important 
exception, in that both liberalization and crisis preceded those of its 
neighbours by at least a decade. 
Moving from systems where authorities set interest rates, 
directed credit, and held a large share of bank deposits as required 
reserves, governments freed commercial banks to make their own 
decisions on borrowers, loan volume, and prices. At approximately the 
same time, capital account liberalization enabled local banks to engage 
in transactions in foreign currencies and allowed foreign institutions to 
enter local markets. Frequently such changes were made without 
having in place an adequate regulatory and supervisory system, which 
compounded problems for bankers without sufficient experience in 
credit analysis of local borrowers, much less the complexities of 
international financial markets. 
The typical results were credit booms, mismatches between 
maturities and currencies, and eventually banking crises. As seen in the 
emblematic Chilean case (but also later in Mexico, East Asia 
and Argentina), the errors by domestic actors themselves could provide  
Financial regulation and supervision in emerging markets: the experience of Latin America since the Tequila Crisis 
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the basis for such crises; if combined with external shocks, the situation could become far more 
serious (see Held and Jiménez, 2001). 
Government rescues tended to follow a standard package. In the first instance, they involved 
takeover of non-performing loans, recapitalization of banks, and liquidations and mergers, usually 
involving foreign institutions. Later, in an attempt to prevent future crises, regulation and 
supervision were stepped up, greater information and transparency were required, and deposit 
insurance was sometimes put in place.3 In the process, the characteristics of the sector changed 
significantly. 
B. Characteristics of the new financial sector 
The financial sectors in Latin American countries remain bank based, but they have 
undergone a number of important changes in recent years. First, the size and depth of the financial 
sector increased in most countries during the 1990s. In part, at least, this was the result of the 
dramatic decline in inflation throughout the region, such that in most countries prices are now rising 
at single-digit rates compared to the three or four-digit rates often found in the 1980s. Thus, 
individuals, households, and firms are more willing to hold money and other financial assets, 
providing the necessary prerequisite for the development of robust financial systems. Better 
institutions have complemented the behaviour of individual agents.4 Table 1 gives an idea of the 
extent of the trend toward financial deepening, using M2 as a share of GDP as an indicator. It shows 
an increase for four of the six Latin American countries during the decade; the prominent exception 
was Mexico. The biggest increase was in Argentina although Chile had the highest levels. The table 
also shows data for four Asian countries. The inter-regional contrast is striking in two senses: not 
only were the levels higher in every case in Asia, but the rate of increase was also higher. 
 
Table 1 
MONEY SUPPLY (M2) AS SHARE OF GDP 
(Percentage) 
 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 
Latin America      
Argentina 14 21 23 29 32 
Brazil n.a. n.a. 28 31 29 
Chile 38 37 43 46 50 
Colombia 20 20 20 24 26 
Costa Rica 32 32 33 33 35a 
Mexico 29 28 26 28 21 
Asia      
Republic of Korea 39 41 43 58 80 
Malaysia 72 80 92 95 103 
Philippines 36 47 56 61 62 
Thailand 75 78 81 103 106 
Source:  Authors’ elaboration, on the basis of IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
a  Figure for 1999. 
 
Second, the existing banks have been allowed to enter new activities, resulting in the 
formation of so-called universal banks. In general, this has been a result of deregulation of banking 
activities, which expanded bank operations into securities trading and insurance and increased their 
real estate activities as well as allowing banks to own non-financial firms. This is a trend that has 
                                                 
3 This became a common approach in the management of financial crises in both developed and (more often) developing economies in 
the 1990s; see Fischer (2001). 
4 On financial institutions, see Burki and Perry (1998) and World Bank (2002). 
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moved in tandem with events in mature economies,5 but unlike some of the latter, securities markets 
in emerging economies are still very underdeveloped and shallow. Therefore, most bank portfolio 
diversification has been into short-term securities, insurance, and real estate activities. 
Third, foreign institutions have become increasingly significant actors in the financial sector. 
Their greater role is part of the liberalization process, as new sectors were opened to foreign 
participation. Three vehicles were used by foreign banks and financial service firms to enter 
developing country markets: privatizations, mergers and acquisitions, and greenfield investment. 
Consequently, as can be seen in table 2, foreign assets as a share of total assets have risen 
substantially in all seven Latin American countries with data available (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela); the increase for Mexico would be much greater if the 
recent sale of the country’s second largest bank were included in the table. It is interesting to note 
that similar trends were found in Eastern Europe but not in Asia.6 
 
Table 2 
FOREIGN BANK ASSETS AS SHARE OF TOTAL BANK ASSETS 
(Percentage) 
 1994 1999 2000 
Latin America    
Argentina 17.9 48.6 49 
Brazil 8.4 16.8 23 
Chile 16.3 53.6 54 
Colombia 6.2 17.8 26 
Mexico 1.0 18.8 24 
Peru 6.7 33.4 40 
Venezuela 0.3 41.9 42 
Central Europe    
Czech Republic 5.8 49.3 66 
Hungary 19.8 56.6 62 
Poland 2.1 52.8 70 
Turkey 2.7 1.7 n.a. 
Asia    
Korea 0.8 4.3 3 
Malaysia 6.8 11.5 18 
Thailand 0.5 5.6 12 
Source:  IMF (2000: 153) for 1994 and 1999; (BIS) (2001: 25) for 2000. 
 
Fourth, there has been a decrease in the number of banks —especially in Latin America 
and in Asia— as a result of mergers and acquisitions just mentioned, including privatizations (see 
table 3). What is somewhat surprising is that this process has not resulted in a significant increase in 
concentration. Indeed, in Asia and Eastern Europe, there appears to have been a decrease in 
concentration. In Latin America, the share of the largest three and ten banks both rose, but not by a 
very large amount. The result implies that the institutions that disappeared from the market were the 
smallest ones. 
 
                                                 
5 On these trends, see Feeney (1994), Blommestein (1995), Fornari and Levy (1999), and BIS (2001). 
6 The issue of foreign participation in the banking sector of developing countries has been extensively studied in the last few years. 
See, for example, IMF (2000), Clarke et al. (2001), Litan et al. (2001), and Hawkins (2002). 
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Table 3 
INDICATORS OF CONCENTRATION IN THE BANKING SECTOR 
(Share in total deposits) 














10 banks HH Index 
Latin America                 
Argentina 206 39.1 73.1 756.9 113 39.8 80.7 865.7 
Brazil 245 49.9 78.8 1 220.9 193 55.2 85.6 1 278.6 
Chile 37 39.5 79.1 830.4 29 39.5 82.0 857.9 
Mexico 36 48.3 80.8 1 005.4 23 56.3 94.5 1 360.5 
Venezuela 43 43.9 78.6 979.2 42 46.7 75.7 923.1 
Asia                 
Republic of Korea 30 52.8 86.9 1 263.6 13 43.5 77.7 899.7 
Malaysia 25 44.7 78.3 918.9 10 43.4 82.2 1 005.1 
Philippines 41 39.0 80.3 819.7 27 39.6 73.3 789.9 
Thailand 15 47.5 83.5 1 031.7 13 41.7 79.4 854.4 
Central Europe                 
Czech Republic 55 72.0 97.0 2 101.5 42 69.7 90.3 1 757.8 
Hungary 40 57.9 84.7 1 578.8 39 51.5 80.7 1 241.8 
Poland 82 52.8 86.7 1 263.6 77 43.5 77.7 899.7 
Turkey 72 40.7 79.1 957.2 79 35.9 72.0 710.2 
Source: IMF (2001:11). 
 
Fifth, there has been some diversification of capital markets. This development has multiple 
causes: the increase in portfolio flows to the region, up until 1998; the privatization of social 
security and the deregulation of private institutional investors, which led to an increase of 
investments in securities; and the virtuous circle created by the process of stabilization and 
securities market expansion in some economies in the region. Table 4 presents one indicator of this 
trend: the volume of debt securities issued in domestic markets (both in absolute amounts and as a 
share of the world total) between 1989 and 2000. While it indicates that such issues in Latin 
America expanded rapidly during the period, more than doubling between 1992 and 2000, the vast 
majority of the increase was due to a single country (Brazil). Moreover, the region’s share of total 
issues remained miniscule. 
 
Table 4 
OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF DEBT SECURITIES ISSUED IN DOMESTIC MARKETS 
(US$ billions and %) 
 US$ billions % of total 
 1989 1992 1997 2000 1989 1992 1997 2000 
All issuers 14 149.7 18 713.2 25 572.7 29 951.3 100 100 100 100 
OECD (excl. Mexico) 13 790.0 18 231.8 24 631.3 28 852.9 97.5 97.4 96.3 96.3 
France 605.8 956.3 1 102.5 1 068.1 4.3 5.1 4.3 3.6 
Germany 729.4 1 260.2 1 732.1 1 688.9 5.2 6.7 6.8 5.6 
Japan 2 558.5 3 355.5 4 399.3 6 088.8 18.1 17.9 17.2 20.3 
United States 6 682.2 8 546.5 12 071.7 14 571.6 47.2 45.7 47.2 48.7 
Latin America 101.2 190.5 448.7 446.3 0.7 1.0 1.8 1.5 
Argentina 44.7 15.5 27.3 38.5 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Brazil n.a. 111.0 344.5 297.0 n.a. 0.6 1.3 1.0 
Chile 7.0 17.4 36.5 34.9 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Mexico 49.5 46.6 38.5 72.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Peru n.a. n.a. 1.9 3.6 n.a. n.a. 0 0 
Source:  Authors’ elaboration, based on Bank for International Settlements (BIS) data (www.bis.org/publ/qcsv0203/anx16a.csv). 
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All of these trends have implications for regulation and supervision. The risks associated with 
the increasing strength of financial crises, a greater mix of activities, the increasing operational 
complexity of the activities undertaken by banks, and a bigger foreign presence can all complicate 
the tasks of regulators and supervisors. A particular danger in recent years has been the increased 
occurrence of ‘twin crises’: simultaneous crises in the banking and foreign exchange markets. As 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) argue, when the two crises take place simultaneously, they are far 
more severe than when they occur in isolation. 
As a consequence of these new challenges, regulators and supervisors must be better trained, 
and in some cases they will need greater support from their respective governments. At the same 
time, the new circumstances may also offer advantages, if the banks see it as in their collective 
interest to improve their image and if foreign supervisory institutions provide useful support. 
Insofar as the local financial sector becomes more sophisticated, there will also be the need for 
coordination among the regulators of the various components. 
C. Regulation and supervision: the state of the art 
Drawing on an important new data bank created by the World Bank,7 we can sketch out the 
current situation with respect to regulation and supervision of the banking sector in many Latin 
American countries at the end of the 1990s. 
Table 5 provides a set of indicators on banking regulation in seven Latin American countries, 
plus the United States as a benchmark. The most widely known indicator is the minimum capital-
asset ratio requirement, currently set at 8% by the BIS through the Basle I agreement. While the 
United States sets its minimum at the 8% level, as do Chile and Mexico, the other Latin American 
countries have higher ratios with Brazil and Argentina at the top of the list with 11% and 11.5%, 
respectively. A similar situation is found with the actual risk-adjusted ratio. With the exception of 
Bolivia, all Latin American countries maintain higher ratios than the 12% found in the United 
States. Again, Argentina and Brazil have the highest ratios.8 
Several other indexes are also presented in table 5. The ‘capital stringency index’ includes 
adherence to the BIS guidelines, but also various measures of the degree to which leverage potential 
is limited (for precise definitions, see Barth et al. 2001a). With a range from 1 to 6, where 6 is the 
most stringent and the US benchmark is at 4, only Argentina among the Latin American countries 
has a score of 6, followed by Bolivia and Peru; Venezuela lags with a score of 2. The ‘capital 
regulation index’ combines the previous index with one measuring the type of assets that can count 
toward the capital-asset ratio, with a range of 1 to 9. On this indicator, Argentina and Bolivia 
represent the highest degree of stringency, followed by Mexico, with Venezuela again at the rear. 
The ‘activities and ownership index’ deals with types of activities that banks can engage in and 
restrictions on who can own a bank. This qualitative index ranges from 1 to 4, with the United 
States at 3. Unlike other indicators, Argentina allows the greatest freedom to banks, while Mexico 
and Bolivia are the most restrictive. 
 
                                                 
7  See Barth et al. (2001a) for a description of the data base, which was constructed from a survey of bank regulators and supervisors in 
107 countries. A companion paper (Barth et al. 2001b) presents a preliminary analysis of the data, which questions the relevance of 
the regulatory and supervisory guidelines stressed in this paper. We believe that the conclusions reached by Barth et al. owe to the 
failure to distinguish between developing and developed countries, whose experiences have been quite different with respect to the 
behaviour of the financial sector. We intend to test this hypothesis in future research. 
8 ECLAC has often advocated that developing countries should maintain ratios above the international norm, given the extremely high 
cost of banking crises. See, for example, ECLAC (2000). 
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Table 5  









































Minimum capital-asset ratio requirement (%) 11.5  11.0 10.0 8.0 8.0 9.1 10.0 8.0 
Actual risk-adjusted capital ratio (%) 16.4 15.8 11.4 12.3 13.0 12.7 14.0 12.0 
Capital stringency index 6.0 3.0 5.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 
Capital regulation index 8.0 6.0 8.0 5.0 7.0 6.0 2.0 6.0 
Overall bank activities and ownership 
restrictiveness index 1.8 2.5 3.0 2.8 3.0 2.0 2.5 3.0 
Source:  Barth et al. (2001a). 
 
It is clear from the data presented in table 5 that regulation has many dimensions, with some 
countries being stricter on some than on others. Nonetheless, there is some tendency for a cross-
country pattern to emerge. As a way of measuring this tendency, we have constructed a summary 
index (the Overall Regulation Index, ORI), by dividing the values in each row of table 5 by the 
average of that row and then summing them up by country. Figure 1 presents the result of these 
calculations. 
The figure shows that Argentine regulation is the most strict, followed by Bolivia; Venezuela 
is the least restrictive. Nonetheless, it is important to note that the United States has a lower level of 
restrictions than do many Latin American countries. Likewise, Chile, which is commonly regarded 
as having the best regulatory and supervisory system in Latin America (Held and Jiménez, 2001), 
does not rank highly on the overall index. It is possible to hypothesize that an inverted U-shaped 
relationship is involved, whereby banks become more self-regulating after some level of 
development (and/or some minimal level of experience) is attained. Thus, lower scores do not 
necessarily indicate poor regulation and supervision. On the contrary, they may indicate that a 
country has advanced to a point where it can allow individual financial institutions a bit more 
autonomy with respect to regulation or for market-based regulation to play a larger role. At the 
same time, it is clear that very strong macroeconomic shocks can undermine even the highest scores 
and lead to banking crises, as the Argentine situation in 2001-2002 shows. 
Figure 1  


















Argentina Brazil Bolivia Chile Mexico Peru Venezuela United
States
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Table 6 uses the same data source to examine trends with respect to bank supervision. While 
more attention is typically devoted to the topic of regulation, the best regulations are of little use if 
they are not enforced. The number of professional supervisors per bank varies widely, from 0.1 in 
the United States to 11.5 in Mexico, but there seems to be only a very weak relationship between 
the number of supervisors and their attributes as measured by the ‘official supervisory index’.9 The 
latter indicator is the summation of 16 measures of supervisory power to deal with abnormal 
situations encountered and the degree of discretion supervisors have under such circumstances. The 
less the discretion and the greater the power, the higher the index. With the United States at 14, only 
Brazil has a higher ranking, while Bolivia and Mexico are the lowest. A subset of the 16 items on 
the supervisory power index is found in the ‘index of forbearance discretion’. Argentine supervisors 
have the least discretion, while Chilean and Venezuelan supervisors have the most. The United 
States is in the middle. 
 
Table 6  









































Professional bank supervisors per institution 2.4 4.0 6.0 3.0 11.5 3.6 1.0 0.1 
Official supervisory index 12.0 15.0 11.0 13.0 10. 14.0 14.0 14.0 
Prompt corrective action index n.a. 6.0 n.a. 3.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 5.0 
Restructuring power index 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Declaring insolvent power index 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Forbearance discretion index 3.0 2.0 2.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 1.0 2.0 
Supervisor tenure index 6.2 15.0 6.0 n.a. n.a. 13.5 n.a. 7.0 
Likelihood supervisor moves into banking index 3.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 1.0 
Percentage of top ten banks rated by  
international credit rating agencies 
100 100 20.0 50.0 n.a. 50.0 40.0 100 
Professional bank supervisors per institution 8.0 8.0 7.0 8.0 6.0 8.0 6.0 8.0 
Source:  Barth et al. (2001a). 
 
The last two items in table 6 deal with what the World Bank calls ‘private monitoring’. The 
index on this topic measures whether an external audit is required, the per cent of the ten largest 
banks that are rated by international rating agencies, the degree of accounting disclosure and 
director liability, and the lack of an explicit deposit insurance scheme. On a scale of 1 to 8, the 
United States, Argentina, Chile and Peru score 8, while Mexico and Venezuela are lowest at 6. The 
percentage of top banks rated by international agencies shows the United States, Argentina, and 
Brazil at 100%, while the other countries in our sample are between 20% and 50%. 
To present a summary view of supervision in each economy, we have created an Overall 
Supervision Index (OSI), following the same methodology used to construct the ORI. Figure 2 
presents the values for OSI across the countries in our sample. Argentina, Brazil and Mexico have 
the highest ratings (the strictest supervisory standards), with Venezuela at the low end, along with 
Bolivia (which, paradoxically, has a comparatively high ORI). As with the overall index on 
regulation, the United States and Chile rank lower than Latin American countries with the highest 
scores, again suggesting the inverted-U interpretation. 
                                                 
9 This result is to be expected, given the differences in the structure of the banking system across countries. In particular, the US 
banking sector is characterized by a myriad of small local banks, while the Latin American countries have a much smaller number. 
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Figure 2  












Source:  Authors’ elaboration, based on table 6; see text for methodology. 
 
The data presented in tables 5 and 6 and in figures 1 and 2 have several problems: they 
represent only a single point in time; they are overview measures that summarize a large amount of 
information in a single number; and they give a somewhat mechanical impression of a very 
complex problem. To get a better idea of some of the details as well as the changes in the regulatory 
and supervisory systems in recent years, we have to turn to studies of the region per se. We mention 
two such studies here before turning to our own country analysis. 
In one of the most important studies, Aguirre (2000) stresses that significant changes have 
been made in banking legislation in almost all of the 17 countries he surveyed. In general, he says, 
these changes have come about as a result of crises or serious problems in the respective banking 
systems. The author identifies key changes as less public-sector ownership, greater foreign 
participation, broader scope for banking activities, and improvements in supervisory and regulatory 
authority. With respect to the latter, he focuses mainly on institutional aspects, such as the agency 
that performs supervision and the scope of the mandate of such institutions (only banks, or also 
insurance and securities). He finds a wide difference across countries, but admits that the literature 
is not conclusive on the relative merits of different systems. 
Another study, by Livacic and Sáez (2000), focuses specifically on supervision. Again noting 
the improvements during the 1990s, the authors emphasize the gap between the rules on the books 
and the ability of supervisors to enforce them. Examples include loans to ‘related’ clients and the 
treatment of overdue loans. They suggest various remedies, including the need for more resources 
(financial and human) and greater autonomy for supervisors. 
D. Basle II and the IMF financial sector assessment programmes 
Most of the changes in bank regulation and supervision in Latin America have been a 
response to events in individual countries or, to some extent, in the region more broadly (especially 
the Mexican crisis of 1994-1995). Nonetheless, developments at the international level have also 
played a role. In particular, the BIS and the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision have been 
influential in putting these issues onto the agenda and homogenizing standards for developed and 
developing countries. In the current period, however, the international standards themselves are in a 
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The Basle Capital Adequacy Accord (Basle I), introduced in 1988, was a milestone in 
banking regulation. The 8% minimum capital requirement for internationally active banks, which 
was adopted by over 100 countries (including most in Latin America), clearly contributed to 
financial stability. Nonetheless, criticisms began to emerge that the approach was too rigid and 
simplistic and that it did not correspond to actual levels of risk. Developing countries were 
especially concerned that the rules provided incentives for short-term over long-term lending. 
Basle II was meant to correct the problems identified by introducing more complex 
alternatives for determining risk, including the use of models developed by individual banks. 
Experts studying the potential impact on developing countries feared that the new approach could 
have a negative impact on those economies through two channels. First, the new risk categories 
would likely lead to a significant decline in lending to developing countries or greatly increase the 
cost. Second, the new system would be inherently procyclical, increasing the frequency of crises 
that have an especially negative impact on the developing world. In part because of these criticisms, 
the implementation of Basle II was postponed to allow further study. (For more details, see Griffith-
Jones and Spratt, 2002.) 
In a parallel initiative, the IMF and World Bank introduced some 60 standards and codes 
(ROSCs) to increase financial stability by offering policy benchmarks. These have been 
incorporated into the IMF surveillance of member countries’ economies through the Financial 
Sector Assessment Programmes. While agreeing that the measures could be helpful, developing 
country representatives have expressed concern that they have no say in determining the standards 
and that implementing all of them would be an extremely expensive undertaking. At the same time, 
they fear that not being able (or willing) to comply would further reduce their chances for obtaining 
finance. (For a discussion of the codes and standards from a developing country perspective, see 
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III. National responses to recent 
financial crises 
A. Financial structure and changes before 
the Tequila Crisis 
Moving beyond regional trends, study of individual country 
cases can deepen our understanding of the reform process as well as 
the problems that still remain. The four countries that have been 
selected —Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico— have much in 
common but nonetheless illustrate important differences in timing, 
operational characteristics, and the macroeconomic environment in 
which the financial sector operates.  
All four economies went through a process of financial 
liberalization at some point between the 1970s and the 1990s, which 
resulted in changes in the way banks operated and eventually in 
banking crises. Chile was the first to embark on the liberalization 
process, beginning shortly after the military coup in 1973. Changes 
included freeing of interest rates, eliminating directed credit, reducing 
reserve requirements, and relaxing regulation and supervision more 
generally. As in the other three cases, it was followed by a rapid 
increase in lending and then a banking crisis in 1981-1984. The crisis 
forced the authorities to take immediate action, restructuring the 
banking sector through the intervention of 21 private financial 
institutions, including the two largest banks in the country. Later, 14 of 
these institutions were liquidated while the rest were rehabilitated and 
privatized again.   
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Soon after the crisis, policy-makers introduced changes in regulation and supervision that 
built on the lessons drawn from the previous experience. The crisis thus led to a modern system of 
prudential regulation and increased supervisory capacity by the state. A new banking law was 
promulgated in 1986, encompassing a lower debt-to-capital ratio, reserve requirements according to 
banks' leverage position, mandatory information disclosure to the public, a partial public guarantee 
of deposits, restrictions on loans to ‘related’ clients, and a strict separation between the core 
business of banks and their subsidiaries. After introducing restrictions, external financial 
liberalization was implemented gradually, as firms were initially allowed to issue bonds and shares 
in external markets; later, institutional investors (banks, pension fund managers, and insurance 
companies) were permitted to hold external assets and capital controls were gradually eased. In 
1997, further changes included adoption of the Basle Committee’s 8% rule. (For more details see 
Budnevich, 2000; Held and Jimenez, 2001.) 
The other three countries began the liberalization process a decade or more later, as part of a 
broader economic reform package typical of the region (see Stallings and Peres, 2000). The 
measures introduced were similar to those in Chile in the 1970s, but each country has individual 
characteristics that distinguished it from the others. 
After a long period recovering from the 1982 banking crisis, Mexico embarked on 
an ambitious new process of financial liberalization in 1988: interest rates were freed, liquidity 
requirements were eliminated, credit allocation directives were abolished, and the previously 
nationalized banks were reprivatized. The response of the banking system was almost immediate. 
There was a rapid growth of lending (around 30% per year in real terms from 1989 to 1994), 
and the share of loans to the private sector rose from 10% to 40% of GDP (Yacamán, 
2001). But, as admitted by most analysts, the first years of privatization were characterized by 
‘reckless —sometimes fraudulent— lending' (EIU 2001:7), resulting from poor regulation and 
supervision, weak credit-analysis procedures, and lack of internal controls. As lending outpaced 
deposits, banks put themselves in a dangerous position by funding their shortfall through inter-bank 
borrowing, mainly from foreign banks. As a consequence, non-performing loans increased from 
around 2% of total loans in 1990 to 9% in 1994, prior to the peso crisis (McQuerry, 1999).  
In addition to these micro-level problems, macroeconomic policies also contributed to the 
build-up of the financial crisis. The use of an exchange rate anchor to control inflation led to 
overvaluation of the peso, large current account deficits, and strong capital inflows. In the short run, 
these flows stimulated growth of credit, but when they were reversed, they would set the stage for a 
twin crisis, as discussed earlier. 
The Argentine financial liberalization, which began in the early 1990s,10 shared some 
characteristics with Mexico. In particular, liberalization —which lifted most of the controls on 
domestic and foreign operations of the domestic financial system that had been imposed during the 
period of high inflation and external constraints— took place in the context of an exchange-rate 
based stabilization programme (Plan de Convertibilidad). The international scenario of the early 
1990s, marked by rising liquidity, declining international interest rates, and increased access to the 
financial markets of industrial countries, led to a surge of optimism in the Argentine markets. 
Simultaneously, price stability and a fixed exchange rate regime abruptly reduced both inflation and 
exchange rate risk. These factors created a fertile environment for the rapid growth of financial 
activity, but also to increasing maturity and exchange rate mismatches. 
The Argentine financial sector had an impressive recovery until 1994: deposits and loans 
grew rapidly, while peso and dollar lending rates fell significantly, although they remained very 
high in comparison to those found in most developed economies and a significant number of 
                                                 
10 Argentina had an aborted attempt at financial liberalization in the late 1970s, but it was reversed as part of the overall abandonment 
of reforms at that time. For an analysis of the earlier attempt, see Studart and Hermann (2001: 34-8). 
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developing economies. These results were a mix of several important features: (i) a process of 
monetization —which normally follows price stability— led to a rapid growth of deposits in the 
banking sector; (ii) an increase of foreign capital inflows, which raised the confidence in the 
Convertibility Plan, raised banks’ propensity to make dollar-denominated loans and borrowers’ 
willingness to borrow in dollars, thus leading to a rapid process of dollarization of both liabilities 
and assets of the banking sector; (iii) the increase of competition among banks and the improvement 
of overall confidence reduced banks’ liquidity preference, resulting in a rapid expansion of credit. 
In the case of domestic banks, this increased liquidity pushed them into being less careful in their 
lending strategies and thus deteriorated portfolio quality. 
Brazil also went through significant liberalizing bank reforms before 1994, although 
beginning from a stronger initial position than the other countries. In this case, the initial 
liberalization preceded stabilization. Three important regulatory shifts marked the development of 
Brazil’s financial system in the early 1990s: external liberalization and the banking reform in 1988, 
plus acceptance of the Basle capital-adequacy ratio in 1994. The Brazilian reform had immediate 
consequences. From 1989, there was a sharp reduction in the number of commercial banks, 
investment banks, and finance companies, most of which became universal banks. An important 
step in the process of liberalization had to do with opening the Brazilian market to the expansion of 
existing foreign financial institutions and the entry of new ones (especially commercial and 
investment banks). These changes should not overestimate the importance of the reform, whose real 
significance was due to the fact that it consolidated a trend already underway during the 1980s: the 
overwhelming dominance of universal banks that operate with a very short time horizon. 
B. The Tequila Crisis and its effects on the stability of the 
banking system 
The devaluation of the Mexican peso in December 1994 set off a crisis that severely damaged 
the country’s banking system and had ramifications elsewhere in the region and in the world. 
Because Mexican regulations limited banks' foreign exchange exposure, the direct problems created 
by the devaluation were less significant than in other cases (although loopholes enabled banks to get 
around some of the restrictions; see O’Dougherty and Schwartz, 2001). Several indirect problems 
were also serious. These included a sharp drop in economic activity, a hike in interest rates, and an 
increase in demand for dollars. The consequence was a growing inability of debtors to service their 
obligations and so a further rise in the already high level of non-performing loans. Initially, 
however, the authorities thought the banking crisis would be limited in scope, because of the 
restrictions on foreign exchange exposure. In addition, the lack of an established regulatory 
authority meant that information was scarce. Thus, the approach was incremental, with solutions 
adopted as new problems appeared (McQuerry, 1999).  
As the other country in the region that was particularly affected by the Tequila Crisis, the 
Argentine banking system was also hit hard. The currency board system in Argentina meant that 
domestic monetary authorities had no other instrument to face the potential capital outflows but to 
allow domestic rates to rise in 1995. This rise in interest rates provoked an increase of arrears and 
defaults, and reduced the confidence of depositors, leading to significant withdrawals of deposits. 
Even though the Convertibility Plan had been successful for almost five years, depositors expressed 
their fears of devaluation by withdrawing dollar deposits. Thus, in addition to a liquidity problem, 
banks had to face increased exchange rate mismatching. The combination of deteriorating quality of 
assets and loss of deposits pointed to the vulnerable side of the seemingly solid Argentinean system. 
In order to avoid an open banking crisis, the Argentine Central Bank (BCRA) began injecting 
liquidity through its discount window, backed by the sale of dollar-denominated bonds —which in 
turn led to an increasing exchange-rate exposure of the government— and by reducing reserve 
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requirements for banks. Despite these steps by BCRA, the accumulated losses corresponded to 12% 
of the banking sector’s net worth by the first semester of 1995.  
Unlike Argentina, the causes of the 1995 banking crisis in Brazil preceded the Tequila crisis, 
even though the latter deepened the problems. The fundamental reasons were associated with the 
abrupt adjustment that the banks had to undertake due to the success of the 1994 stabilization 
programme (Plano Real). During the 1980s, banks earned substantial profits from inflationary gains 
associated with the peculiar role of double intermediary of the public debt that the Brazilian banks 
enjoyed during the long period of high inflation and indexation. The abrupt decline of these gains, 
and the high fixed costs in Brazil’s banking sector, led private banks to expand credit, which 
allowed the boom in consumer demand following the 1994 stabilization programme.11 The rapid 
and sometimes careless expansion of credit, the high interest rate policy, and the rising 
unemployment provoked a rise of non-performing loans and arrears. The monetary authorities tried 
to restrict this expansion by setting very high levels of reserve requirements, which nonetheless 
failed to constrain credit expansion. In addition, interest rates were maintained at high levels, which 
created an increasingly dangerous mix of credit expansion and high lending rates. The public banks 
faced additional problems due to their limited capacity to restructure their portfolios (dominated by 
state government debt) and their high operational costs (in view of the job stability of many of their 
employees). The Tequila Crisis was ‘the last straw’ in a process of increasing bank problems. 
Chile was much less vulnerable than the other countries for two reasons. First, its 
macroeconomic performance was barely affected by the Tequila Crisis, due to its lower levels of 
external debt, strong trade balance, and sound domestic fundamentals (e.g., high growth and fiscal 
balance). Second, as explained above, the Chilean banking system had already gone through major 
changes in supervision, regulation, and structure. As a matter of fact, from 1991 onwards, bank 
activity started expanding at a rate which was slightly higher than that of GDP, such that the 
relation between loans and GDP expanded from 45% in 1990 to 66% in 1999 —much higher than 
the peak achieved in 1984. Other indicators also point to an improvement in the efficiency and 
further consolidation of the banking sector (Ahumada and Marshall, 2001: 46-7). 
C. Regulatory changes after the 1994-1995 crisis 
The Tequila Crisis unveiled the strengths and vulnerabilities of the banking systems of the 
four countries. The speed and depth of the changes in regulation and supervision varied with the 
information available to authorities, their perception of the severity of the problems confronting 
them, and the instruments they had at hand. In this context, Chile's situation —with almost no 
impact on the banking sector— stands out as completely different from the other three cases and 
shows the importance of its earlier steps in cleaning up the banking sector, establishing a modern 
regulatory and supervisory system, and maintaining comprehensive real macroeconomic balances. 
In Argentina, after 1995, given the characteristics of its monetary and exchange rate regime, 
it became clear that (i) its banking sector was highly vulnerable to changes in domestic interest 
rates, exchange rates, and depositor confidence; (ii) domestic banks were more vulnerable than the 
foreign-owned ones; (iii) since the capacity of the monetary authorities to intervene in periods of 
crisis was very limited under the Convertibility Plan, some additional mechanisms were needed to 
increase systemic liquidity (especially for dollar deposits). In order to overcome these weaknesses, 
an initial set of measures was introduced to restructure the sector by injecting more capital, 
promoting mergers and acquisitions, and creating incentives to the expansion of foreign banks.  
                                                 
11 In the first months of the implementation of the Plano Real, Brazil’s Central Bank expanded the monetary base very rapidly to 
accommodate the expansion of the demand for money, which usually occurs after a successful price stabilization programme. This 
expanded liquidity also increased the reserve base of the domestic banks, permitting them to expand credit.  
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Among the most important regulatory changes, five should be emphasized. First, the Fondo 
Fiduciário de Capitalización Bancaria represented a full restructuring programme supported by 
funds of the BCRA and aimed at capitalizing and strengthening the banking sector through 
incentives for the acquisition of banks in trouble by those with a more solid market position. 
Second, the Fondo de Garantía de Depósitos was a deposit insurance scheme financed by private 
funds, aimed to increase depositor confidence and the safety net of the banking sector. Third, a new 
system of reserve requirements was introduced in order to reduce leverage and improve safety. This 
new system widened the scope of the previously existing policy to encompass all bank liabilities, 
rather than just sight and saving deposits as was the case earlier. Fourth, the Programa Contigente 
de Pases was an innovative mechanism to increase the systemic liquidity of the banking sector by 
establishing contracts between the BCRA and international banks in which the former acquired the 
right to sell to the latter dollar-denominated government bonds and mortgage-based securities. This 
meant that the participating banks provided a short-term overdraft line that gave the BCRA a 
lender-of-last resort facility in times of crisis.12 Finally, measures were introduced to stimulate the 
continued process of mergers and acquisitions and to expand the share of foreign banks in the 
domestic market. 
The results of these policies initially seemed quite positive in many respects. In the second 
half of the 1990s, private bank provisions in relation to total credit increased substantially, liquidity 
within the banking sector rose, and the capital adequacy ratio was maintained at levels far beyond 
those establish by the Basle I guidelines. In addition, foreign banks more than doubled their share of 
the market between 1994 and 1999. In sum, the banking sector became more solid, which explains 
why its ability to deal with the emerging market crises that characterized the late 1990s was far 
superior to what was observed after the Mexican crisis. Nonetheless, macroeconomic policies —and 
especially the Convertibility Plan— eventually undermined these improvements as the banking 
sector fell into a severe crisis after the devaluation of 2002. It will clearly take many years to 
recover. 
Brazil also took important steps to strengthen its banking system, but, as mentioned above, 
these were not prompted by the Tequila Crisis itself. During the first three years of the successful 
stabilization programme, 40 banks (of the 271 that existed in July 1994) were intervened by the 
Central Bank: 29 were liquidated, 4 failed, 6 were placed under temporary administration, and 1 
continued to operate. A further 32 banks went through restructuring that resulted in mergers and 
acquisitions, some of them with government support through the bank restructuring programme 
(PROER), which included fiscal incentives for banks to acquire other financial institutions and 
promotion of mergers (among domestic banks) and acquisitions (by foreign banks). Another 
programme (PROES) was directed to the restructuring of the public financial institutions, which 
were in particular difficulties. This facility was created by the Central Bank to provide bridge loans 
to federal and state banks to speed up their restructuring and in some cases their privatization or 
liquidation. In the process of restructuring, foreign banks were allowed to enter the economy. The 
number and participation of foreign banks increased significantly after 1995, representing a 
competitive challenge to Brazilian banks.  
In addition to the restructuring of the banking sector, a series of complementary regulatory 
measures was also decreed in late 1995. These included the establishment of a deposit insurance 
fund guaranteeing up to R$20,000 per depositor, and increased capital requirements for establishing 
                                                 
12 This mechanism —designed to deal with liquidity problems— did not work during the recent crisis because of the magnitude of the 
challenges facing the BCRA. That is, since in a currency board the central bank does not act as lender-of-last-resort, the mechanism 
was a way of mimicking this role in periods of reduced liquidity of specific banks. However, the mechanism was not meant to be an 
instrument to deal with potential solvency problems, as in the case of the recent crisis. In a solvency crisis of the magnitude faced by 
Argentina, if the mechanism had been used, the international banks would have had to cover a very significant part of total Argentina 
deposits, increasing the risk to their own assets to unacceptable levels. Thus, it was not used, and the government had to freeze bank 
deposits to avoid the overall insolvency of the system. 
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new banks. Separately, new Central Bank regulations aimed to promote accountability and avoid 
bailouts by insuring that the shareholders of institutions sold or transferred were liable for any 
previous wrongdoing. Perhaps the most significant of these additional measures was the law giving 
the Central Bank authorization to preventatively restructure financial institutions that were not 
meeting system requirements or were demonstrating financial problems. While a form of this law 
had existed previously, and the Central Bank was authorized to place banks under one of three 
forms of special regime (temporary system of special administration, intervention, or extra-judicial 
liquidation), these laws lacked a preventative character. Now the Central Bank was empowered to 
prescribe preventative remedies (e.g., increased capitalization, transfer of stockholder control, or 
mergers and acquisitions) for faltering banks, and certain assets of failing banks could be 
confiscated. An indicator of the effectiveness of the changes was the lack of a serious banking crisis 
in the face of the devaluation of 1999. 
Mexico moved more slowly than Argentina and Brazil in dealing with its financial crisis. 
Indeed, Mexico has remained in constant banking difficulties since 1995 and is still involved in a 
costly process of restructuring its banking system. The government set up several programmes to 
help recapitalize and strengthen the banks. The best known was administered by the deposit 
insurance agency, FOBAPROA, which involved the purchase of the banks’ non-performing loans to 
clean up their balance sheets. In addition, a number of banks were intervened and later re-sold, 
leading to a dramatic increase of foreign participation in the banking sector (Graf, 1999).  
In December 1998, new financial legislation was approved by the Congress and then 
implemented. Chief among the changes were: (i) a new deposit insurance system, which ended the 
de facto unlimited deposit insurance that existed previously and increased the oversight of the 
deposit-insurance agency; (ii) stricter accounting standards, which increased the transparency of 
credit operations both for supervisors and the public, imposed stricter standards for handling past-
due loans, and substantially increased loan-loss provisions; (iii) a series of measures to improve 
lending practices and new laws on credit transactions, aimed to speed the process of foreclosing on 
assets and allow for a wider range of property to be used as collateral, and (iv) stricter rules on 
capital quality (EIU, 2000). In addition, in order to reduce possible future exchange rate 
mismatching, the Bank of Mexico lowered the existing ceilings on foreign currency liabilities and 
imposed compulsory liquidity coefficients in foreign currency (Yacamán, 2001). As an aftermath of 
the crisis, banking activity as a percentage of GDP declined from 1994 to 1996, and only in 1996 
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IV. Conclusions: policy lessons 
from the Latin American 
experience 
As we have seen through the experiences of Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, and Mexico, managing the financial system today is an 
enormous challenge, especially in developing countries. The inherent 
fragility of the financial sector is magnified by the volatility of capital 
flows and the macroeconomic shocks that have been discussed in 
earlier chapters of the book. The resulting instability mounts as 
problems of individual banks quickly spread to other institutions and to 
the real economy as well. While such problems have always existed, 
new ones are continually arising with the increased integration of 
international capital markets.  
It is important to stress, as we have throughout the chapter, that 
financial instability is not an isolated problem, but is closely related to 
macroeconomic policy and performance. The relationship runs in both 
directions. On the one hand, financial crises undermine attempts to 
maintain stable growth rates of output and thus to increase 
employment opportunities and reduce poverty. They are also 
extremely expensive and can hobble government finances and private-
sector viability for years in the future. On the other hand, 
macroeconomic policy can bring about financial instability or even 
crises. For example, raising interest rates can create problems for the 
financial sector, especially if it is already in a weakened condition. 
Likewise, devaluing the local currency is very risky if the financial 
sector is heavily indebted in foreign currency.  
Financial regulation and supervision in emerging markets: the experience of Latin America since the Tequila Crisis 
 26 
Among our cases, Chile provides a good example of the way in which a well functioning 
financial system can be an important asset for an economy. After the significant corrections 
introduced as a result of the deep financial crisis in the early 1980s, the financial sector became a 
crucial instrument in maintaining high economic growth for a long period, and it gave policy 
makers room to follow flexible policies when hard times came. At the other extreme, the Argentine 
crisis is an especially dramatic example of negative interactions between the two. Despite 
significant improvements in regulation and supervision during the 1990s, the banking system was 
kept afloat after the January 2002 devaluation only by tight capital controls and the freezing of 
deposits. 
Based on our analysis, and in the context of these new dilemmas, several policy lessons can 
be suggested for developing countries. First, it is clear that much remains to be done in the specific 
areas of regulation and supervision. Some countries are more advanced than others are, but all can 
do more in terms of institutional development in the supervisory area, greater transparency of 
regulations, and so on. Nonetheless, it is important to ponder the apparent relationship that emerged 
whereby the tightest regulations are not necessarily found in the best-performing banking systems. 
This may mean that very strict regulations are important as the banking system begins to develop, 
but it may be possible to relax them somewhat in the longer run, if and when banks begin to take 
greater responsibility for their own behaviour. 
Second, even those countries that have made substantial progress in the regulatory and 
supervisory sphere cannot assume that this is sufficient. The best regulatory and supervisory 
systems assume a relatively stable macroeconomic environment. The procyclical nature of the 
banking sector, with its implications for stability, is exacerbated in the case of Latin America due to 
the nature and sharpness of its recent business cycles. In a situation of strong volatility, whether 
domestic or international or both, the financial system will become increasingly fragile. Thus, 
regulation of the financial sector must go hand in hand with adequate fiscal, monetary, and 
exchange rate policies as well as with measures to prevent external shocks from ravaging local 
economies. 
Third, because of this highly procyclical behaviour, some observers have begun to 
recommend provisioning rules that take into consideration changes of risk throughout the cycle 
(see, for example, Ocampo, 2002). Under such a system, like that which is currently in place in 
Spain, risk is estimated for categories of credit according to the possible loss that a typical asset 
would experience over the entire cycle. Even though this method aims to provide a cushion for 
changes in risk throughout the cycle, Ocampo argues that it can also be a countercyclical 
instrument.  
Fourth, there are other problems in the financial sector that have little to do with regulation 
and supervision —or may even involve tradeoffs with the latter. That is, the main function of the 
financial sector is to support the development of the local economy. This involves the providing of 
credit in such volume that production and consumption can grow at an appropriate rate. If 
regulations are too tight, banks may prefer to hold only the safest assets, whether government bonds 
or loans to the largest and lowest-risk customers in the private sector. Consideration must be given 
to these aspects of the financial system and balance them with the obvious need to make the system 
a safer one. 
Finally, a supportive international environment must complement a sound domestic 
regulatory and supervisory system in developing countries. This includes adequate macroeconomic 
coordination in industrial countries as well as appropriate regulation of the financial systems in 
those economies. It also means that any new international regulations must consider the 
implications for developing countries. It must be recognized that the impact on the financial sector 
of industrial and developing countries is not the same, and both must be taken into account. 
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